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Abstract:This article aimed to shed light on viability of politically motivated Sino-
Japanese aid competition in Southeast Asia and its social and economic implications 
from the recipients’ perspectives. One of the central messages of this article is, “local 
conditions matter” for aid projects to attain their expected economic outcomes. Post-
war Japan started as a recipient country of World Bank loans, with monumental 
infrastructure, most of which were considered a success. This article challenged 
this conventional view and argued that they had mixed results at least in the short-
run for those politically motivated projects. China and Japan seem to be competing 
over “national pride” rather than “national interests” when it comes to foreign aid 
in infrastructure. The rivalry challenges the unity of Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) from the member countries’ points of view, where there seems to 
be a widening gap between nations that are increasingly integrated into BRI networks 
through “connectivity” rhetoric and those that remain disconnected from the network. 
The paper concluded with the implications of Sino-Japanese aid competition for post-
COVID international relations.
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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is quite likely to be remembered as the most significant 
turning point in history after World War II. In the same year that the World Bank, 
in its World Development Report 2020, shed light on the effectiveness of “global 
value chains,” quite ironically, a “negative globalization” has become apparent 
as the poor, the elderly, and other weak groups within society have suffered 
considerable setbacks in both developed and developing countries. The plan for 
a “post-COVID” reconstruction must start from the decision of whether countries 
should progress in the direction of co-existence and co-prosperity or that of 
isolation. Given the influence held by Japan and China in the Asian economy, one 
must be aware of how much responsibility each country holds. The unfortunate 
reality is that on-going battles of words between America and China have 
gathered attention as the world strives to find countermeasures to COVID-19, 
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and it exemplifies the “G-Zero World” (Bremmer, 2014), the power vacuum in 
international politics. Is there a way for Japan to contribute to the international 
public good without being involved in the conflict between these two countries?
Looking back, China and Japan waged war twice in modern history, and both 
countries have even scores.  Japan defeated China in Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895) and gained Taiwan’s territory as well as territorial status of the Korean 
Peninsula as a result, making Japan a military power in East Asia in the late 19th 
century.  Japan was later defeated by China in the “Greater East Asia War”1 (Second 
Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945, World War II 1941-1945, combined).  Diplomatic ties 
were reestablished in 1972 with a historic reconciliation and symbolic “handshake” 
between Premier Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.  Despite occasional 
tensions over political or territorial issues over the Senkaku Islands, the two countries 
have intensified economic interdependence ever since.  Until the outbreak of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, major touristic destinations in Japan were hospitable to visitors 
from China who spent thousands of dollars during their stay.  With a decreased young 
population in Japan, top universities in Japan depend more and more on tuition paid 
by wealthy Chinese students who also study really hard.
Despite economic and cultural rapprochement over the past several decades, a 
business war has  been severely fought between these historical rivals across the 
globe in recent years, and most fiercely in Southeast Asia. During Deng Xiaoping’s 
state visit to Japan in 1978, he rode on the Japanese high-speed railway (HSR) or 
‘Shinkansen’ (new line) and was reported as saying “this is the speed [to which] 
we must catch up.” (People’s Daily online, 2008) Who imagined that in just 30 
years China and Japan would compete for speed and contracts of HSR in the 
world? In September 2015, Japan lost a USD 5 billion contract to China to build 
Indonesia’s HSR connecting Jakarta and Bandung.  In the same year, Japan 
won a contract over China to build India’s first HSR connecting Mumbai and 
Ahmedabad.  Competitions have been witnessed in other countries; Thailand, 
Singapore-Malaysia, and Vietnam, though some of these countries have given up 
their HSR plans as it turns out that it is not cost-effective enough and thus difficult 
to convince taxpayers who would bear the financial burden.
The clash over HSR is inevitable. On one hand, Chinese HSR has been a major 
tool to enhance economic as well as political “connectivity” among major cities in 
China. China’s HSR serves half of the entire population of China and, with more 
than 4,000 km of HSR network, it has caught up with and gone beyond Japan’s HSR 
despite the latter being inaugurated much earlier. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Hong Kong, and up to Ürümqi (Uighur) are all serviced. It is not surprising and 
geographically (or geo-economically) natural for China to try to extend its network 
from Kunming to Phnom Penh (Cambodia) or Bangkok (Thailand) in the Greater 
Mekong River Sub- Region (GMS) Countries, as an important vehicle to promote its 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the other hand, the Shinkansen, the fastest and 
safest train in the world for decades since inauguration in 1964, has been a source 
of national pride for many Japanese. The defeat of Shinkansen in Indonesia in 2015 
prompted the Abe Administration to announce the Quality Infrastructure Partnership 
(QIP) campaign in 2015 (Zhao, 2019), and more recently, the Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (FOIP) Initiative. The FOIP has been received with great concern among 
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policymakers in China, it is viewed as a “negative campaign against BRI” (China 
net online, 2019) working as a strategy against China to contain it through the 
networks of US, ASEAN member countries and increasingly India.  Japan sees BRI 
rather negatively meanwhile China regards FOIP/QIP in quite the same way.  
Obviously, HSR represents only a small part of official development assistance 
(ODA) for both countries. Other fields of regional public goods, such as public health 
(medical assistance, for example) against pandemics, maritime security against 
pirates, and employment creation programs during the economic crisis, could be 
less mutually exclusive and thus there is still room for possible collaboration in the 
future. Though public transportation is in the general public interest, riding the HSR 
is a luxury for most users in developing countries. This was also the case for Japan 
around the time of its inauguration in 1964. Therefore, HSR has been seen as a 
more lucrative investment than non-lucrative aid for China and Japan. Competition 
in the market can maximize social surplus, as economics textbooks tell us, but only 
with a perfectly competitive market. There are only a limited number of players in 
the HSR market, and these companies are virtually state-owned or government 
supported. This results in conditions (costs and benefits) that may well fall below 
the level of efficiency, which makes such projects economically unviable for the 
recipient country.
Regardless of whether one likes or dislikes the concept of “international 
connectivity”, its permeation and expansion within various fields is an undeniable 
social phenomenon of modern times. Its influence in diplomatic policy is 
considerable as is how it affects economic policy. The Belt and Road Initiative 
reduces the trading and logistics costs between countries thus helping them 
achieve peace and prosperity through international trade, consistent with the 
type of liberalism that has supported post-Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations, 
1776) free market theory and international organizations such as the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). From a free competition viewpoint, 
competition between Japan and China to provide the best quality aid is desirable.
This article tries to shed light on the viability of politically motivated Sino-Japanese 
aid competition in Southeast Asia and its social and economic implications from 
the recipients’ perspectives. One of the central messages of this article is, “local 
conditions matter” for aid projects to attain expected economic outcomes. The 
post-WWII Japan started as a recipient country of World Bank loans spent on 
monumental infrastructure projects (dams, power plants, roads and railways, in 
particular), most of which were considered a success. This article challenges 
this conventional view and argues that they had mixed results at least in the 
short-run for those politically motivated projects (with parochial interests), such 
as HSR.  Already back in the early 1960s, the World Bank report (1961) warned 
against the various risks of Japanese HSR, which are quite suggestive for Sino-
Japanese competition over HSR in Southeast Asia. Today, the two countries 
seem to be competing over “national pride” rather than “national interests” when 
it comes to rail. The paper attempts to capture the significant lack of internal 
and external coherence for China to push the HSR bids in Southeast Asia, 
where the term “connectivity” is interpreted as a hidden agenda for Chinese 
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leadership. It also explores the unity of Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) from local views, where there seems to be a widening gap between nations 
that are increasingly integrated into BRI networks through “connectivity” rhetoric 
and those that remain disconnected. Finally, the paper concludes with implications 
of Sino-Japanese aid competition on post-COVID international relations in Asia.
Sino-Japanese “War” Over Southeast Asia in the 21st Century
During the summer of 2020, Ginza streets in central Tokyo were decorated with 
“Tokyo 2020” flags, despite no real Olympic Games being held due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Olympic Games held in Japan and China marked somewhat fateful 
turning points in modern history - characterized by wars and conflicts. For instance, 
the Tokyo Olympic Games have been cancelled twice, the first one in 1940 due 
to the Sino-Japanese War, and the second one in 2020 was “postponed” due to 
the pandemic “war”. The 1964 Tokyo Games was seen as a turning point of the 
post-war reconstruction of Japan. The Shinkansen (or Japanese HSR), the world’s 
fastest train at that time, started to operate just a week before the Olympic Opening 
Ceremony. In the 1960s, China was completely isolated from the rest of the world 
and their economy deteriorated amidst the ideological campaign during the Cultural 
Revolution. The country launched drastic economic reforms with an open door 
policy under Deng’s leadership in the late 1970s, leading the nation eventually to 
become a major economic power by the early 2000s. The 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games marked another turning point in Sino-Japanese history after which China 
overtook Japan as the second largest economic power in the world.  
Since around the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, however, China started to 
play a role of regional leadership, or in the eyes of most Western observers, an 
emerging “hegemonic power” threatening the Pax-Americana that characterized, 
for better or worse, most of the time in the post-war period. For most developing 
countries, the so-called “spirit of Bandung”2 (from the Bandung Conference of 
1955) survived the Cold War period as common values if not binding principles. 
At the same time, it was often used as political rhetoric justifying non-interference 
policies for assisting authoritarian regimes in developing countries by donors 
(including Japan). Together with India and some 30 representative countries from 
Asia and Africa, it is well known that China and Japan were among the participants 
of the Bandung Conference. Both of which later became major donors, loyal to 
the Bandung spirit of non-interference, where virtually only economic interests 
matter. Bandung received international attention 60 years after the conference 
over the Sino-Japanese diplomatic battle over the Jakarta-Bandung HSR.
In terms of an aid menu, it is no surprise that more similarities than differences exist 
in terms of what Japan and China can offer to the recipient countries. The very similar 
aid models of the two countries can be said to be a version of the Harrod-Domar (HD) 
model, where financing of economic infrastructure entices private investors to follow 
suit and, paired with a high savings rate, aims to achieve high economic growth. The 
HD model was also consistent with the Keynesian model of public investments. Long 
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before the shift toward the “Washington Consensus” paradigm in the 1980s, with 
the denial of the government’s role, it can be said that this was the modus operandi 
of financing for the World Bank, which became the default model for international 
financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Another, albeit related, point is that Japan and China both use loans as a 
type of foreign assistance, helping the building of infrastructure (as an economic 
basis) such as roads, bridges, electric power plants, and so on in Southeast Asia. 
Following the HD theory, these public investments are intended to have spillover 
and multiplier effects that result in an increase in private investments, which in 
turn, lead to high economic growth. Both countries achieved double digit economic 
growth in this way. On the other hand, European and American donors, whose 
aid policy is more centered around grants than loans, warn that this may create a 
“debt trap.”  Therefore, both countries are accountable for the world to address if 
extending well-targeted loans are more productive than devastating in attenuating 
this debt trap, in their assistance for HSR and all other investments abroad.
In the economic growth period of the 1980s, Japanese aid was criticized 
internationally as being developmentalist, mercantalist, having strings attached, 
being anti-environmentalist, and having a low grant element. In those days, Japan 
was pursuing the so-called “trinity” model of aid, in which a powerful Japanese 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, currently METI) was playing 
a role of benign “broker” of private sector interests, pursuing foreign aid as a 
promoting mechanism of Japanese exports and investments particularly in the 
Southeast Asian market, which was the real cause. Whereas as rhetoric, aid was 
promoted as a catalyst for private sector-led growth, as a counter argument against 
Western criticisms. Also, in those days, there was even a “religious” belief among 
Japanese aid professionals and supportive researchers that Japanese trinity model 
was superior to any of the Western models.
With the shift toward a more collaborative form of aid in the 2000s, exemplified 
by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and international goals (MDGs, SDGs), 
Japan has followed international requests for debt reduction, increasing the grant 
element (or making its loan menu more concessional) while decreasing the amount 
of overall aid. The country has fallen from first place within the G7 to a relatively 
lower one. During this period, China has surpassed Japan’s GDP to become 
the world’s second largest economy and, as it now aims to become the largest 
economic power with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), its ODA is now receiving the 
same criticisms as Japan did earlier. Japanese politicians and experts have started 
boasting qualitative superiority in somewhat ideological statements, focusing on 
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),” “Quality Infrastructure Partnership (PQI),” 
“international rules,” and so on.
Before the “tragedy of Bandung” in 2015, when Indonesia turned down the 
Japanese proposal of HSR, Japan was overly confident about their superiority 
over China in obtaining the HSR bid.  The total “defeat” of Japan therefore was 
seen as a diplomatic humiliation for Japan.  However, if the project was targeted at 
something else, both nations could have been more cooperative with each other. 
For instance, highway or toll road networks could be nicely sliced into packages 
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of co-financing projects, which could then be mutually beneficial, unlike HSR 
which remains too exclusive to be sliced into those co-financing packages among 
competitors. What this example seems to show is that some projects are “zero-
sum” while others are “win-win”, depending on the nature of the invested sectors. It 
seems that, however, with a little bit of mutual effort, the HSR could be at least partly 
converted into a “win-win” sector if both countries are ready to work on a common 
basis, such as achieving safety rules or guidelines on rail traffic, for example.
In the case of the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, when Indonesians said “Sayonara 
to Shinkansen,” (Tempo, 2015) they compared the two countries’ proposals. 
The Jokowi Government, who would face reelection for a second term in 2019, 
opted for the Chinese menu that offered a more timely schedule, thus making it 
politically more attractive.
Table 1
China-Japan Competition Over HSR in Indonesia3
                        
Indonesia wishes to extend its HSR network to Surabaya, the second largest 
city in East Java, as was originally planned.  Bandung was NOT included in 
the original master plan, financed by Japan, but it was added later to make 
the project more lucrative; capturing higher expected demand than connecting 
Jakarta and Surabaya directly, costing much more, and generating much less cash 
flow.  In transportation economics, it become more apparent that, despite what is 
widely believed, HSR is NOT economically viable. Firstly, since neither the Japanese 
nor Chinese HSR system can be constructed on the existing railtrack, the new land 
purchase requires huge capital investment and social costs. Secondly, higher speed 
imposes higher operational and maintenance (O&M) costs per kilometer, which is 
often difficult to recover by operational revenue (ticket prices), which is set generally 
lower than its marginal costs.  It is well known that the Taiwanese Shinkansen system 
has been running operational deficits since its inauguration in 2007.
The World Bank report of 1961 already mentions the risk of rising O&M costs, 
when it financed the Japanese HSR system. (The World Bank report. 2019)The 
report mentions that the HSR (“New Tokaido Line”) should consider having a dual 
operational system for “around the clock” operation: during the day, for passengers, 
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the train goes faster (200 km/h), while for cargo operations, the train should go slower 
(150 km/h) during the night in order to save costs. Japan spent 200 billion yen on 
the first HSR, when the national budget was 1,500 billion yen, of which 50% went 
towards land purchase costs. Unfortunately, the cargo plan was never materialized 
due to the high land purchase costs and noise pollution concerns for residents.
In the 1960s in Japan and across the world, air travel was pricey, and trains 
were the only means of transportation for most people. Railway was, in those 
days, run by the Japan Railway Corporation (a 100% state-owned enterprise). It 
took over three decades before the privatization of the national railway took place. 
All ticket prices were therefore heavily subsidized (subject to approval by Diet, or 
parliament in Japan) making it difficult to achieve a full cost-recovery. In many parts 
of the developing world, train tickets are still heavily subsidized, and Thailand, for 
example, gave up on HSR due to financial unviability.   
As shown above, the competition over the HSR market may not make economic 
sense. The competition between China and Japan has been heavily politicized by the 
diplomatic rivalry beyond economic profits in Southeast Asia, and it matches exactly 
what recipient country want to satisfy politically. In the same year Japan “lost” the 
HSR deal in Indonesia, it “won” another with India for its Mumbai-Ahmedabad HSR, 
with very generous lending condition for India (2 trillion JPY with 0.1% interest rate 
for 50 years), though tied with Japanese companies.  By 2020, both projects have 
seen major delays and cost overruns. After all, competition over national pride is very 
costly.
Does Chinese Aid Create More 
Debt Trap than Japanese Aid?
Chinese aid has been criticized by Western observers as it creates a “debt trap” and 
dependence on  the Chinese supply chain. Japan used to face similar critiques in its 
heyday of aid power in the 1980s. The Japanese “trinity” hypothesis, once justified 
as motivation for developing countries to make efforts toward more sustainability 
(in a narrow sense, the ability to repay financing, and, in a wider sense, the driving 
force behind economic growth). Can Japan say that its loan-type of foreign aid has 
contributed more than China’s?
As seen in the previous chapter, the answer to this question may largely depend on 
which sector the lending finances; if it generates higher or lower economic returns. It 
may also depend on the susceptibility of borrower nations, which can be defined both 
economically and politically, for foreign intervention in the form of aid. Susceptibility 
should refer to debt sustainability in an economic sense, while it could imply matching 
with the needs of local political elites. Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, best known 
in China as a Japanese leader who established diplomatic relations with mainland 
China in 1972, is known as a corrupt politician in Japan who favoured the parochial 
interests of his constituency in rural Niigata by connecting it to Tokyo via HSR. The 
Indonesian President Jocowi behaved like Tanaka, when he chose Chinese HSR 
in 2015, for his reelection in 2019.
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When Japan launched the first economic assistance to Southeast Asian 
nations (Myanmar, to begin with, then extended to the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia) in the 1950s, as de facto war reparations, there was no 
consensus among donor nations about the scheme or modality of assistance. 
Gradually, by the 1970s, the OECD member countries have agreed to define 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) as financial flow whose “grant element” 
(calculated on the basis of interest rate, year of repayment, and grace period) is 
over 25%, while that with a grant element below 25% is called “Other Official Flows 
(OOF).” It was the first efforts for aid harmonization, which culminated as MDGs 
three decades later. After decades of administrative chaos for aid administration 
in Japan, by 2008, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had been 
given a function as a principal agency responsible for all ODA operations in 
Japan, including soft loans, grant and technical assistance. Meanwhile, the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) has been conceived as a 
more private-oriented financial institution specialized with the OOF, such as 
equity participation for Japanese investors in emerging economies in Asia. The 
Chinese definition of aid is ambiguous, however. China is not a member of 
the OECD, which implies that it does not have to report data to the OECD 
secretariat, so it does not distinguish between ODA and OOF; aid is calculated 
as public investments mainly financed by the Export Import Bank of China and 
Development Bank of China. Despite its definitional ambiguity, it is clear that, 
after 2000, Chinese lending has kept increasing and has become the biggest 
creditor in many developing countries, including Southeast Asian countries.
Whatever the definition of ODA could be, the point seems to center around the 
question of how more inducive the lending condition can be towards promoting 
growth than aggravating debts.  Lending, by definition, increases the debt stock, 
while it can reduce the burden of debt repayment, by expanding the economic 
base with growth-oriented industries. In other words, “quality” of lending matters 
much more than quantity.  
On the other hand, quantitative analysis, conducted separately (Japan 
Society for International Development. 2020), shows first that regarding the aid 
quality and debt trap, the grant element and deferment period are significantly 
negatively correlated with the DSR, and significantly positively correlated with 
the debt stock. The same analysis also shows that the grant element and 
economic growth factor are significantly positively correlated. These results 
imply that making loans more concessional (by increasing the grant element 
and grace period) is likely to reduce the aid burden in the short term, but with 
the risk of increasing it in the long term.
Somewhat counter-intuitively for those who believe in the “trinity hypothesis”, 
Japanese yen loans show a significant negative statistical correlation with 
the debt stock, while Chinese loans show a significant negative statistical 
correlation with the DSR, according to the same analysis. This hypothesis may 
not be easily interpreted as useful policies, while it shows that the Japanese 
ODA loans, by creating the basis for the economy (infrastructure) allow for an 
increase in self-sufficiency efforts. In the long term, this mechanism reduces 
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the debt stock. Chinese loans might improve the debt burden in the short 
term, which goes against a widely-held view. Increasing the grant element of 
aid reduces the debt burden in the short term, but worsens the debt stock in the 
long term. Furthermore, making loans more concessional may help increase 
the economic growth factor, but the results hold regardless of the lending 
countries and it does not depend on individual countries such as Japan and 
China, as the money is fungible.
The problem of aid money being fungible has been debated for more than 
two decades. This also means that the source country for foreign aid should 
not, in practice, present a problem itself. In addition, for most high performing 
Southeast Asian economies, the debt sustainability has not been a major 
economic issue; as their continued economic growth has functioned as a secure 
collateral against default (unlike some countries in Sab-Sahara Africa or Latin 
America). For Southeast Asian borrowers, Sino-Japanese competition over 
more concessional lending scheme has been more diplomatic in nature. The 
more the two countries compete, the more financial beneficial it becomes for 
borrowers; and this will mean a lot during the next few years for most ASEAN 
member countries which will have barely started to launch their recovery plans 
from the COVID-19 recession in 2020.
Susceptibility of ASEAN Member Countries 
to Aid from China and Japan
Rhetorical battles over Chinese “Belt and Road” (BRI) or Japanese “free and open” 
(FOIP) have been waged in diplomatic games, but both sides have somewhat 
calmed down their tones in diplomacy in recent years. In 2019, Xi and Abe met 
face-to-face in the G20 summit held in Osaka, and Xi was also invited as an official 
State guest to Japan in 2020 (though this was suspended due to COVID-19). As China 
faces more economic confrontation with the United States, it makes more economic 
sense to set aside its own political agenda temporarily.  
After all, Japan was the first pro-Western nation that re-opened diplomatic 
relations with China (interrupted by the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989) 
in 1992 with the state visit of Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko who 
were received with enthusiasm by the  Chinese people.  In that sense, Japan has 
been a loyal observer of the “Bandung Spirit” of non-intervention.
Japan was the only OECD country, after all, that continued to assist Myanmar 
under the military dictatorship until the early 2010s. Japan was also generously 
assisting other authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia during much of the Cold 
War period. In this way, most ASEAN member countries became borrowers of 
Japanese ODA loans in major infrastructure, while their governance structure 
remained non-democratic.  
Today, ASEAN member countries seem to be split between “democratic” vs. 
“non-democratic (authoritarian)” sides, which does not necessarily correspond with 
how rich the country is in terms of income per capita. Almost all member countries 
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started as newly independent nations in the post-war period, without charismatic 
political leaders, who used all their powers to mobilize resources towards making 
the HD model achieve the miraculous growth of the late 1980s or early 1990s.  
Lee Kuan Yew said, “You’re talking about Rwanda or Bangladesh, or Cambodia, 
or the Philippines. They’ve got democracy. But have you got a civilized life to 
lead? People want economic development first and foremost. The leaders may 
talk something else. You take a poll of any people. What is it they want? The 
right to write an editorial as you like? They want homes, medicine, jobs, schools.” 
Neighboring ASEAN countries followed the Singaporean model, some of which, 
like Indonesia or the Philippines, became more democratic, while others remain 
authoritarian.
The crucial point is how susceptible a country is in terms of accepting 
“democracy”, which, for most political leaders in ASEAN is some sort of luxury good 
after you achieve economic growth successfully. Until that stage is reached, most 
Asian people live their lives happily as long as they will have better jobs tomorrow 
rather than today! Some GMS countries remain single-party governments with 
a “communist” party without communist economic principles, while their political 
system is as authoritarian as the Chinese system. It is no wonder that these 
countries are leaning towards China in receiving aid and investment, as they 
are more susceptible. Once Japan starts to switch its non-interference principle 
(of Bandung) to a pro-Western democratic position, as has been interpreted by 
some, these countries will get further away from Japan.
Implications for Post-COVID 
International Relations in Asia
Faced with both domestic administrative needs for streamlining operations as well 
as international demand for increased transparency of foreign aid in China, Beijing 
established in 2015 the China International Development Cooperation Agency 
(CIDCA) as a foreign aid agency to perform what was previously done through a 
complex network of independent channels with the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, various financial institutions, and so on. This administrative 
reform is still underway as of 2020. CIDCA has started promotion and public 
relations (including some sort of “propaganda”) activities on its homepage which 
is also available in English. Thus slowly making its presence more noticeable. 
(China International Development Cooperation Agency)  CIDCA moved quickly 
in the COVID shock; much quicker than JICA. One of the remarkable CIDCA 
achievements during COVID was providing emergency medical aid to countries 
such as Ethiopia, Angola, Sri Lanka, and more, which had a history of receiving aid 
from China. Between March and April 2020, information on the CIDCA emergency 
medical aid was updated daily, describing China’s aid in great detail. However, 
starting from the 1990s, the JICA was the main actor in the field of international 
emergency medical aid through the dispatching of the Japan Disaster Relief. 
Its modus operandi was to promptly help with natural disasters, and so on, and 
68 Takeshi Daimon-Sato
to praise Japan’s role in overcoming them. In 2015, an “Infectious Disease 
Response Team” was inaugurated, based on the experience of the previous year 
in helping with the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. However, as far as the COVID 
response is concerned, the JICA was not as active as CIDCA, and centered more 
on the infection status of employees and experts as well as news on the halted 
dispatch of volunteers (at least in the initial stages of COVID-19). As other donors, 
such the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, keep giving notice of 
emergency aid one after the other, Japan seems to have lost its position as an aid 
provider in emergency relief. On the other hand, in China, in cooperation with the 
Alibaba Group Holding (and its founder, Jack Ma), an internet platform for sharing 
medical information in Chinese and English, “One World One Fight,” was promptly 
established, greatly surpassing Japan. Even when it comes to information warfare, 
Japan focuses on inbound information.
In his keynote speech in that forum, Jack Ma said in English (Global MediXchange 
for Combating COVID-19, 2020), “we should cooperate with Africa in fighting 
infectious diseases. In this field, it should be obvious what is preferable between 
competition and cooperation among countries, but we are responsible for that 
decision. In only two weeks, China has been able to provide 50 countries with 
emergency medical supplies, and this is also thanks to the aid of Ethiopian Airlines. 
We want to keep strengthening the relationship between China and Africa.”
 The post-COVID international relations might be characterized by how much 
“social distance” people are ready to take in terms of a dire dilemma between 
authoritarianism versus democracy.  Some European countries have obtained 
more complete social security through a complete lockdown albeit a significant 
limitation of individual freedom. The transfer of personal rights to the state and 
life security are, in a sense, a trade-off. In Japan, this limitation was not as strict 
and thus the economic security obtained was not total. Furthermore, contact 
route tracing via AI empowered smartphones, as was performed in South Korea, 
was not performed in Japan because the people are not ready to provide private 
information due to strong privacy concerns. In practice, local prefectural requests 
were observed by people as if they were administrative orders or laws. As the 
industries, shops, and so on that did not comply with these requests were made 
public by the government without any mercy, the first pandemic wave was thought 
to have subsided. However, as of August 2020, the virus is spreading rapidly. 
Japanese society is paying the cost of democracy in the end.
Many developing countries have been unable to limit personal rights, failing to 
provide complete life security and leaving many citizens (some of which turned 
to rioting) without opportunities for employment. This has led not only to financial 
disaster but also to a threat to the continued existence of these countries as a whole 
and to the risk of overall worsened security. As developed countries are focused 
on reconstructing their own economies, it is unlikely that developing countries would 
be able to receive sufficient aid. Considering that China is the largest source of aid for 
these countries, the risk of the authoritarian state model, where “personal rights are 
limited but without economic security,” spreading worldwide is rather high. International 
relations will be decided by the extent to which people accept the Chinese model.
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According to officially published data, the number of COVID cases in China 
has settled after March 2020. The “sudden appearance” of new deaths in mid-
April of the same year has been reported to have been caused by a review 
of the statistics. European countries and America are requesting the Chinese 
government investigate and provide clarity regarding the origin of the virus. At the 
same time, the American government has been spreading the rumor, as if it were 
fact, of the Wuhan Institute of Virology intentionally spreading the virus in order to 
dodge criticism regarding America’s poor response to the pandemic, and this has 
further worsened the relationship between America and China. As the pandemic 
leads the European economy to destruction, even the leaders of countries such 
as France and Germany, who had taken a positive stance toward the Belt and 
Road Initiative, have had to criticize China’s response.
In an interview with the Australian Financial Review, the Chinese ambassador 
to Australia said that “The investigation that America is requesting (probing into the 
truth) is politically motivated, and, as such, I cannot agree with it. We should rely on 
WHO’s investigation. If Australia happened to join America in this request, there is 
no doubt that the Chinese people would have second thoughts about coming here, 
as tourists or to study abroad, and about consuming Australian products such as 
wine and beef,” implicitly criticizing the Australian government.4
When compared to this, the Japanese government could be said to have not 
openly taken an adverse stance towards China. Traditional media (newspapers, 
TV, etc.) simply repeat the information coming from the Prime Minister and the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, without criticism. There are not requests for 
investigations aimed at China as there are in the European and American media, 
nor independently performed research. The South Korean media does seem to 
praise its country’s response to COVID while criticizing Japan’s, but again, there 
seems to be no criticism toward China. As we will explain later, this cannot be 
unrelated to the growing reliance of Japan’s and South Korea’s economies on 
China. The main Singapore media outlets show a similar affinity to China in their 
reports (Straits Times, 2020).5 In May 2020, the People’s Daily published an article 
titled “10 doubts regarding the disease – The American government has the duty to 
take responsibility and answer,” strengthening the confrontational attitude toward 
the US (Renmin Wang, 2020). The 2020 “Global Development Report” from the 
World Bank warned that, while the global value chain is evolving, some countries 
and people are being left behind, and it is important not to fall prey to the increasing 
country-level individualism and isolationism. This could be said to be a type of 
idealism that goes against the “liberal” view that the main consensus of economists 
bases their opinion upon6 (Deudney-Ikenberry, 1999). This way of thinking directly 
confronts the retrospective “realist” view of considering aid (as well as trade and 
investments) as “a diplomatic tool to pursue the benefit of one’s own country” 
(Morgenthau 1962). While different from the classic realism of the period that saw 
America and the Soviet Union fight against each other in the Cold War, this neo-
realism can be seen as a characteristic of this “G-Zero period,” marked by the 
trade competition between the US and China among other things. Propelled by 
international relationship theory (which focuses on regionality, identity, and social 
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norms), constructivism has positioned itself even within aid theory, for example 
through promoting the eradication of poverty and SDGs as a high-level norm (Hume-
Fukuda-Parr 2009). From any perspective, aid can be said to be a diplomatic and 
political mediation tool.
There is little doubt that the post-COVID foreign aid market in Asia and Southeast 
Asia will be influenced by Chinese power, and the position of traditional aid powers 
including Japan and US will suffer from retreats at least in the short run. Chinese 
authorities have been using foreign aid as an important diplomatic tool everywhere 
in the world, in order to keep its influence in the recipient countries, and this is 
exactly why ASEAN countries are facing an important decision about the extent to 
which they can give up their institutionalized democracy while using resources from 
China in order to accelerate their economic recovery from the COVID shock. 
Conclusion
In 2019, the World Bank published “Belt and Road Economics,” describing the 
importance of creating and connecting infrastructure in South Asia and adopting 
policies that obviously show a favorable stance toward the Belt and Road Initiative, 
such as a publication celebration seminar to which executives from offices throughout 
South Asia, including Japan, have been invited. In the 2020 “Global Development 
Report,” the general tone was that of promoting a further strengthening of the 
global value chain while fighting isolationism. Such is the condition of organizations 
such as the World Bank, which has often sided historically with the American 
government. The current international society has reached the point where UN 
organizations, especially the WHO, are increasingly reflecting the opinions of the 
Chinese government.
The Japanese economy cannot sustain itself without China. The core industries 
that aid the Japanese economy have widely relied on materials and food provisions 
from China. For example, most of the metals the automotive industry relies upon 
are imported from China, as are more than half of all imported vegetables. Most IC 
chip exports are towards China showing that, whatever the political differences, the 
import/export symbiosis between Japan and China is unavoidable; the  Japanese 
economy is very much dependent on China.
Today, COVID has provided further challenges for Asia and the world. Dealing 
with the continued expansion of China’s power in the “post-COVID” (with COVID) 
international community framework is an unavoidable issue. The Belt and Road 
Initiative is a core diplomatic strategy for this expansion, and Japan must find a 
realistic stance within the future international framework.
Haruki Murakami spoke publicly in his radio broadcast in May 2020, with a calm 
but warning tone, “Some politicians compare the fight against COVID with a war, 
but I am against that comparison. Unlike a war, where there are allies and enemies, 
now we must all cooperate and rack our brains to find ways to survive through this 
ordeal.” Unfortunately, the world is still far away from what Murakami dreams of, but 
there is some progress made.
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During the video conference held by the ministries of the ASEAN Plus Three 
(China, Japan and South Korea) countries on COVID-19 in April 2020, the necessity 
for cooperation within the region has been confirmed. Furthermore, the expectations 
regarding the contributions of China and South Korea, who have already “defeated 
the coronavirus”, and of Japan, who is on its way to “defeating” it have been made 
clear. Infection countermeasures are a public good for the whole region, just as 
countermeasures are against terrorism and illegal drugs. The healthcare systems of 
most ASEAN countries are already insufficient during normal times, and during an 
emergency such as this, very few countries are able to survive without external help, 
creating fear of the demise of entire countries. The economic system of East Timor, 
which, while not part of the ASEAN, is geographically located in the ASEAN region, 
depends on petroleum income, making the downfall of the country a realistic threat.
As shown by the relations between America and China, Japan and China, and 
China and South Korea, direct negotiations between two countries tend to result 
in antagonism as each pursues their own benefit. The existence of the ASEAN 
Plus Three forum (a non-traditional security threat framework) is able to relax 
this antagonism and ease conflicts thus providing a framework for all countries to 
contribute to the public good of the region; this should be actively praised.
Competition over aid between China and Japan has triggered many expected and 
unexpected repercussions in recipient ASEAN countries. Despite economic damage 
caused by COVID, the two countries are expected to play important roles for post-
COVID reconstruction of the world in the long-run, not only as financial sources but 
also as sources of knowledge and experience about how they have survived conflicts 
of interests in economic and political fields. 
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Endnotes
1 This appellation was originally adopted by the Tojo Administration (1941-1944), 
though it was banned by the US Occupation Forces under General McArthur in 
the postwar period as it was considered ‘symbolic of Japanese militarism.’  It is 
more common now to use the term Asia-Pacific War in media, though carrying 
definitional ambiguities, thus this paper keeps its original title.
2 The ten principles of the Bandung Conference included, “1. Respect for 
fundamental human rights and for the purposes and the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations.” “2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of all nations.” “3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality 
of all nations large and small.” “4. Abstention from intervention or interference 
in the internal affairs of another country.” “5. Respect for the right of each 
nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of 
the United Nations.” “6. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective 
defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention 
by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.” “7. Refraining from 
acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any country.” “8. Settlement of all international 
disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or 
judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.” “9. Promotion of mutual 
interests and cooperation.” “10. Respect for justice and international obligation.”
 3 Salim, W. and Nagara, D. S.(2016), “Why is the High-Speed Rail Project So 
Important to Indonesia,” ISEAS Perspective No. 16.
4 See the website of the Chinese Embassy in Australia
5 For example, the Straits Times (online version) https://www.straitstimes.com/ 
(May 1, 2020 edition) criticized the request for an investigation against China 
from the Australian PM.
6 Liberalism (internationalism) has been said (Mawdsely, 2012) to even be able 
to counter the effects of the threat of a pandemic, but a comparison with the 
reality has shown that this view was exceedingly optimistic.
